Section 1: Introduction
Since the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC), hundreds of billions of dollars of tax-payer money has been used to support financial firms in the US. A similar story also unfolded in Europe. International reforms are well underway in an attempt to address some of the problems that contributed to the crisis. 1 One phenomenon that has emerged as a concern in the GFC is the increased complexity and connectedness of financial markets. In the April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF determined that systemically important institutions are not limited to those that are the largest, but also includes others that are interconnected and that can impair the normal functioning of financial markets, including the provision of credit to households. Thus rather than focusing on "too big to fail" banks, they discuss the "too connected to fail" problem.
Our paper builds on an emerging literature that applies network analysis to finance. A better understanding of connections between directors and companies is leading to new insights in many areas of finance.
In this paper we examine connections between directors via shared directorships on other boards. We test whether banks that received Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds of $1 Billion or more from the US government during the GFC had more director connections than other financial institutions. On one hand, directors that share common directorships may act less like individuals and more like a single voice on a board, and the decision making of independent directors may be influenced by other directors more so than if they did not share outside directorships. In this case, weaker governance may be a reason that these banks received TARP funding whereas other banks didn"t. Alternatively, connected directors may be better at assisting banks in receiving government funding in times of crisis because they are well-connected and can work their rolodex. Thus the connections could be seen as beneficial to banks that are too-big-to-fail.
The findings in our paper provide an alternative view to the results in Adams (2009) , who examined the relationship between governance and the TARP funding for banks. She found a higher proportion of independent directors at TARP-funded banks than non-TARP banks and suggested that too many outside directors could be problematic at complex financial institutions that require directors with specialised knowledge. We agree that TARP-funded banks have similar numbers of independent directors as other banks. However, we find that the banks that received TARP funding had significantly more director connections than other banks and suggest that these connections may have considerable impact on the board that needs to be further explored in later research to determine whether it dilutes director independence, or provides beneficial support in times of crisis.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 covers the past literature on director independence and director networks. It also provides some background on the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Section 3 describes the data and our methodology for determining connections between directors, Section 4 provides the results and Section 5 concludes.
Section 2: Prior Literature
Fundamentally boards are a mechanism for addressing the agency problem that exists in the separation of ownership and management in a publicly traded company. While independent directors can contribute to board effectiveness in monitoring the actions of management, such directors may also have less information about the company and its business and hence be less effective in providing advice to management on strategy.
A large literature has examined boards and corporate governance and whether board structures, in particular board independence, impact on firm performance (see surveys by John and Senbet (1998) , Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2008) ). Empirical results on whether board independence increases firm value are mixed (see discussion in John and Senbet (1998) ). One criticism of these studies is that board structures are determined endogenously (see the survey by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) ) which hampers the ability for empirical studies to find links between performance and board independence.
Another criticism of studies that focus on board independence is that these studies examine observable traits of a board and use those as proxies for unobservable behaviours of board members. Several studies have started to dig deeper into board structures beyond the key variables available on major databases. In particular, research on director networks and connections between independent directors and executive directors has emerged as a new way of examining board structures (Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2007) , Hwang and Kim (2009), Larcker, Richardson, Seary and Tuna (2005) , Barnea and Guadj (2009), Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) ).
One complication with the emerging director networks literature is that each paper uses a different definition of connections between boards as they are addressing different research questions. Some focus on board members who are CEOs of other companies (Hallock (1997) , Fich and White (2001) ), boards with common directors (Mizruchi (1996) , Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2007) sell-side analysts as board members (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) ).
One key important feature of the director networks literature is that board members may satisfy the regulatory definition of an independent director, but may have connections that potentially conflict with that independence. Taking these additional connections into account provides new insights into board effectiveness.
Some implications of weaker corporate governance due to network connections are: higher compensation for CEOs, Larcker et al (2005) and Barnea and Guedj The US government issued clear statements about the institutions that received funding via TARP, such as "CPP is not a "bailout", and "Treasury will invest…in U.S banks that are healthy". However, the program remains controversial. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2009) provide some evidence that capital infusions under the CPP were provided to banks most likely to pose systemic risk, were exposed to funding uncertainties in volatile capital markets, had weak capital structures, but had sound loan portfolios compared to banks whose applications were rejected. This suggests that funds were directed to economically viable institutions, albeit with high exposures to funding risk.
Veronesi and Zingales (2009) also criticised the CPP arguing that the program was designed to benefit bondholders and that it created little value for shareholders relative to the costs imposed on taxpayers, who essentially funded TARP.
Section 3: Data
Our analysis in this paper is centred on connections between directors on a particular board. To do this we use director data from Riskmetrics which covers 1500 companies each year from the S&P500, S&PMidcap400 and S&PSmallcap600
for the period 1996 to 2008. The banks that received TARP funding are all in the S&P500 index, and we will limit our comparison sample to the other companies that are in the S&P500 index (66 financial companies and 399 non-financial corporates). The comparison firms are shown in Panel B. The average board size increases from 10.4 to 11.5 for the S&P500 non-TARP financial institutions and from 9.1 to 10.4 for the nonfinancial corporations. Although this board size is still smaller than the average size of 13.6 directors for TARP banks, it is closer than for the broader S&P1500 sample and thus a better comparison. Similarly we see increases in the number of directorships per director and average total assets of the S&P500 comparison companies that brings them closer, albeit still below, the TARP sample.
As a starting point to examining the board independence of banks that We re-calculate an alternative measure of director independence for each board by only including non-connected independent directors in the numerator. As the TARP banks have the most connected directors the adjustment is greatest for this group. 
Section 4: Results

Concurrent Board Connections
BOARD INDEPENDENCE AT S&P500 COMPANIES ADJUSTED FOR CONCURRENT DIRECTOR CONNECTIONS
Historical Board Connections
Another dimension of board connections is that directors may have had shared directorships prior to the current board. Via these historical connections the directors may have formed networks. We provide evidence on the existence of these connections in this paper, but leave for future work the question of the impact on corporate governance.
To capture historic connections we examine whether a director pair were on another board together prior to commencing their common current directorship. Focusing on the independent directors, the percentage that had a historical connection with another director prior to joining the current board is similar to the percentages for all directors: 27.8 per cent, 9.9 per cent and 10.6 per cent for TARP banks, non-TARP financials and non-financial corporations respectively. Thus when we adjust the percentage of independent directors to exclude those with historic connections to other directors prior to joining the board, we find (Figure 4) that the TARP banks have much lower director independence than the other S&P500 companies.
Figure 4 BOARD INDEPENDENCE AT S&P500 COMPANIES ADJUSTED FOR HISTORIC DIRECTOR CONNECTIONS
The historical connections for directors at TARP banks may be partially explained by the merger activity in the banking sector during the late 1990s as some of the directors may have served together at the takeover target bank prior to the merger. Overall it is clear that a significant minority of the independent directors at the TARP banks had prior working relationships with other directors on the board.
If we re-examine director independence by excluding those independent directors who have either a concurrent connection or a historic connection the difference between the TARP-funded banks and the other corporations is wider than before, as the TARP-funded banks have directors with more concurrent and historical connections. 
Length of director connections
The extent of the historical connections can be further demonstrated by the average length of time that the board members overlapped on both historical connections and concurrent connections. F-statistics=3.58, p-value=0.03 ).
Given the prevalence of connected directors and the average length of connections between directors, the board composition is likely to be affected by these long-standing interactions between directors. The level of connectedness of the banks that received TARP funding appears to be fundamentally higher than on the boards of other corporations.
Who is connected?
Although we are attributing significance to the presence of director connections, it is also possible that board connections between directors could be benign overlaps between people. As the TARP banks tend to have slightly larger In Table 5 we examine the makeup of the director pairs. We separate director connections into four categories: independent, where both directors are independent on both boards; mixed, where both directors are independent on one board but at least one is non-independent on the other board; and nonindependent, where at least one director is non-independent on both boards. From Table 5 , in most cases we see that a minority of the director connections are between two directors who are both independent on both boards.
This type of connections might be benign outcomes of directors being chosen from a small pool of candidates. For the non-TARP financial institutions the majority of connections are between two independent directors however this is based on only 18 director connections in 2008.
Director connections where both directors are independent on one board, but one director is an executive or linked to the executives on the other board could be problematic, as a supposedly independent director has an external connection with an executive of the company.
Connections where the directors are executives or linked to executives on both companies could occur due to subsidiary companies, joint ventures or spinoffs.
Did a connected board increase the likelihood of receiving TARP funding?
Although the univariate analysis suggests that TARP-funded banks have substantially more connected boards than other corporations, we have not controlled for other variables that may be driving the relationship, specifically firm size.
Larger banks received more TARP-funding, as did more highly levered financial institutions. Adams (2009) found that financial institutions with more independent directors had an increased probability of receiving TARP funding, but did not control for other variables. The regressions show that there is no difference in board size between the TARP banks and non-TARP financial institutions, and TARP banks have fewer independent directors, in contrast to Adams (2009) results due to our comparison sample being S&P500 firms only. 4 In addition the TARP banks have more director connections, and thus when board independence is limited to only non-connected independent directors, the TARP banks have significantly fewer independent directors, particularly when historical connections are also included.
These results suggest that the banks that received TARP funding may have directors that satisfy the SEC definition of independence but are more networked than at other financial institutions.
Section 5: Conclusion
Our main contribution in this paper is to examine whether interconnectedness of directors differs between financial institutions that received TARP funding and those that did not. Although the TARP funding was not "distress"
or "bailout" funding per se, it was government assistance to facilitate the survival of the US financial system. Although some banks paid back the TARP funding at the first possibility and have argued that they never needed it, some research has provided evidence that banks receiving TARP funding had lower capital ratios, were more highly levered, and were perceived to have been vulnerable without the injection of funds (Bayazitnova and Shivdasani (2009) ). In addition, the banks that received more than one billion in TARP funding were more systemically important than other banks.
Adams (2009) has provided preliminary evidence on corporate governance and those banks receiving TARP funding. Her conclusion is that TARP banks did not have worse board structures and governance on average, and, by contrast appeared to have more independent boards than other financial institutions. She suggests that too much independence can result in boards that do not have enough expertise to understand the business activities of complex financial institutions.
Our results show that once size is accounted for, the TARP banks had fewer independent directors, and even fewer non-connected independent directors.
One implication of our study is that SEC regulatory rules on independent directors that result in "tick the box" compliance fail to capture the complexity of governance. Future regulatory reform in the area of governance would be better focused on a principles-based approach where regulation of governance addresses board decision making, interactions and behaviour.
